SSRN Author: Giorgio MartiniGiorgio Martini SSRN Content
http://www.ssrn.com/author=2409230
http://www.ssrn.com/rss/en-usFri, 01 Dec 2017 01:51:55 GMTeditor@ssrn.com (Editor)Fri, 01 Dec 2017 01:51:55 GMTwebmaster@ssrn.com (WebMaster)SSRN RSS Generator 1.0REVISION: The Simple Economics of Optimal PersuasionWe study Bayesian persuasion problems in which the Sender's preferences depend only on the mean of posterior beliefs. We show that, given a price schedule for posterior means, the Sender faces a consumer-like choice problem, purchasing posterior means using the prior distribution as her endowment. Prices are determined in equilibrium of a Walrasian economy with the Sender as the only consumer and a production technology that garbles the state. Welfare theorems provide a verification tool for optimality of a persuasion scheme, and characterize the structure of prices that support the optimal solution. This price-theoretic approach yields a tractable solution method for persuasion problems with infinite state spaces. Moreover, we show that the approach extends to the general case with no restrictions on Sender's utility.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2785970
http://www.ssrn.com/1647541.htmlThu, 30 Nov 2017 16:40:01 GMTREVISION: The Simple Economics of Optimal PersuasionWe study Bayesian persuasion problems in which the Sender's preferences depend only on the mean of posterior beliefs. In this environment, the economics of optimal persuasion are simple: Given a price schedule for posterior means, the Sender faces a consumer-like choice problem, purchasing posterior means using the prior distribution as her endowment. We propose a verification tool for optimality and characterize the structure of prices that support the optimal solution. Our approach provides a tractable solution method for persuasion problems with infinite state and action spaces, and yields a necessary and sufficient condition on the Sender's objective function under which the optimal persuasion mechanism can be guaranteed to have a monotone partitional structure.
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2785970
http://www.ssrn.com/1593354.htmlWed, 24 May 2017 03:59:13 GMT